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Sumwalt et al.: Flight Path Monitoring

This research examined how ineffective monitoring of flight path can
adversely affect aviation safety. Monitoring of the flight path is accomplished by
effecting scanning of flight instruments and cockpit indications to derive
information pertaining to aircraft energy state and trajectory. These instruments
include: attitude indicator, airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator, altimeter,
navigation instruments, and flight mode annunciations. To better understand the
failure of pilots to monitor flight path, this study focused on literature addressing
human factors, and analyzed accident and incident data supporting both this study
and the supporting literature. This study yielded useful recommendations for air
carriers to implement the stipulations by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) which require specific training in monitoring for pilots.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has long identified
ineffective flight path monitoring to be problematic. A seminal crash occurred in
December 1972, when the flight crew of an Eastern Airlines Lockheed 1011
crashed into the Florida Everglades. According to NTSB (1973), while attempting
to replace a faulty landing gear indicator light, one of the flight crewmembers
inadvertently bumped the control column, forcing the autopilot out of the altitude
hold mode and placing it into a gradual descent. The crew’s preoccupation with
replacing the jammed light assembly took more than four minutes. Thus, the crew
did not notice the descent into the dark, featureless terrain. The aircraft careened
into the Everglades, claiming 99 lives (NTSB).
NTSB continued to note problems with ineffective monitoring. In 1994,
NTSB released a safety study of crew-involved air carrier accidents. That study,
which looked at 37 air carrier accidents that occurred between 1978 and 1990,
found that ineffective monitoring and challenging was a factor in 31 of the 37 (84%)
reviewed accidents (NTSB, 1994). In that safety study, NTSB recommended that
the FAA train pilots to use better monitoring techniques (NTSB, 1994).
In spite of that recommendation seemingly being accepted by stakeholders
in response to the NTSB, we identified 17 accidents where poor monitoring was a
factor, and which occurred since the NTSB’s study period (1990). These results
suggest that improved monitoring will require more work.
In response to a safety recommendation issued by NTSB in November
2013, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published a final training rule
that will require air carriers to incorporate explicit training pertaining to improving
monitoring (National Archives and Records Administration, 2013). Airlines must
incorporate this training into their programs no later than March 2019 to meet
compliance standards (National Archives and Records Administration, 2013).

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2015

1

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 2 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 8

In spite of training requirements for monitoring established by the
aforementioned regulation, requirement for training for monitoring, our literature
review found that more research is needed to determine how to train pilots to be
more effective at monitoring (NTSB, 2009).
Given that 1) dozens of aircraft accidents have demonstrated that ineffective
flight path monitoring poses an unacceptable risk to aviation safety; 2) between
now and 2019, air carriers will be required to train pilots to more effectively
monitor; and 3) more research is needed to determine how to train pilots to be better
at monitoring, this research examined issues that can adversely affect flight crew
monitoring of the flight path. Findings of this research were used to formulate
recommendations to facilitate training of flight path monitoring.
Scope and Limitations
The goal of this research was to better understand factors that can lead to
pilots’ ineffectiveness at monitoring the aircraft flight path. The research focused
on understanding those cases in which the aircraft flight path was not sufficiently
monitored, leading to flight path deviations. Cases involving inadequate monitoring
of radio communications, intra-cockpit communications, traffic, and aircraft
systems were not within the scope of the study. Only accidents and incidents where
the aircraft has two or more pilots were studied; events involving single pilots were
not studied.
Objective
The objective of this research was to yield a greater understanding of factors
leading to ineffective flight path monitoring, thus formulating useful
recommendations to be employed by air carriers that will birth successful
monitoring techniques in their aircrews. An extensive literature review was
conducted to better understand human factors that can lead to ineffective flight path
monitoring. Additionally, data were extracted from aircraft accident reports and
incident reports that were submitted to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration’s (NASA) Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). These
analyses derived information pertaining to the phase of flight in which the flight
path deviation occurred, who or what detected the deviation (if detected at all),
factors that contributed to the deviation, and the ensuing consequences (e.g., loss
of separation, loss of control, altitude deviation).
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The following hypotheses were established and tested:
H1A: There is a statistically significant difference between accidents and
non-accidents in this study’s dataset regarding which pilot was the “pilot flying”
(PF) when inadequate monitoring led to a flight path deviation.
H10: There is no statistically significant difference between accidents and
non-accidents in this study’s dataset regarding which pilot was the “pilot flying”
(PF) when inadequate monitoring led to a flight path deviation.
H2A: There is a statistically significant difference between who or what
detected the flight path deviation.
H20: There is no statistically significant difference between who or what
detected the flight path deviation.
Literature Review
A variety of exigent literature was reviewed to reveal limiting human factors
and obstacles to effective monitoring. Topics reviewed included workload,
inattentional blindness, change blindness, vigilance, and the effects of flight deck
automation.
Raby and Wickens (1994) examined how pilots strategically planned
workload and allocated tasks to accommodate increasing workload. Their review
of several sources found that “breakdowns in task management do occur, and may
at times be responsible for dangerous in-flight incidents” (p. 215). They noted that
crews who experienced the highest workload were those who had the greatest
tendency to delay critical tasks until later in the flight. Similarly, the higher
performing crews were those who performed tasks earlier. Jentsch, Martin, and
Bowers (1997) had a similar finding in their study of ASRS reports, finding that in
approximately one-third of the ASRS reports they reviewed, poor workload
planning, and task execution led to failed flight path monitoring.
Multitasking, as explained by Wickens, Santamaria, & Sebok (2013), can
involve concurrent processing and serial processing. In concurrent processing,
“attention is divided by sharing scarce, multiple resources in the brain” (Wickens
et al., 2013, p. 763). Due to overload, the brain may be incapable of concurrent
processing. At this point, it operates on serial processing, in which the brain
switches back and forth between tasks (Wickens et al., 2013). While attempting to
switch back and forth between tasks, the brain must attempt to select the
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information to attend to, process it, encode it into memory, and finally, store the
information (National Safety Council, 2012). Different types of information stimuli
engage different neural pathways. Because competing bits of information flow
across different pathways, mental processing speed and capability is compromised.
As a result, information may be dropped or omitted from processing (National
Safety Council, 2012).
Wickens et al. (2013) illustrated how monitoring breakdowns can occur
when someone devotes more time to non-monitoring tasks, such as troubleshooting
a problem, and fails to switch back to monitoring. Several factors can influence
how likely someone is to switch back to the ongoing task, including task inertia
(the tendency to stick with more difficult task), priority, interest in the alternate
task, and the salience of the reminder to return to the ongoing task (Wickens et al.,
2013). Meta-analysis by Wickens et al. (2013) found that unknowingly sticking
with the easier tasks is the most common mental strategy. Because monitoring isn’t
usually the most interesting or easiest task, it becomes the neglected task.
Loukopoulos, Dismukes, and Barshi (2009) noted “one of the most common
forms of error during multitasking is forgetting to perform some intended action”
(pp. xiii – xiv). Additionally these authors noted that:
a special case of forgetting to perform tasks is to become so preoccupied
with one task that the individual inadvertently stops concurrent monitoring
the status of other tasks. Even when monitoring does not drop out
completely, the quality of monitoring may suffer and pilots may fail to
notice changes in the status of the monitored system. (Loukopoulos et al.,
2009, p. 4)
Experiments conducted by Mack and Rock (1998) found that one quarter of
their test subjects did not perceive an object’s presence, even though it was plainly
in sight. They concluded that the phenomena of not “seeing” something that is
plainly visible was not a function of sight, but rather, one of attention being
elsewhere. That is, although the item was plainly there, the person was mentally
attending to something else. Nikolic, Orr, and Sarter (2004) discussed how pilots
can miss changes on their flight deck displays. For example, a pilot may notice a
particular mode annunciation on the flight mode annunciator (FMA). If the pilot
then directs his/her attention away from the FMA attend to something else, then
looks back at the FMA, they may not notice a change of mode status on the FMA.
In terms of human ability to adequately process data in respect to workload,
the Flight Safety Foundation (2014) noted that “the human brain has evolved for
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active engagement in individual tasks that are challenging or stimulating, yet is less
effective at monitoring for events that so rarely occur” (p. 12). Warm, Parasuraman,
and Matthews (2008) stated that “converging evidence using behavioral, neural,
and subjective measures shows that vigilance requires hard mental work and is
stressful” (p. 433). Teichner (1974) found that not only does probability of
detecting something decrease over time, the degree of performance degradation can
vary depending on the strength of the signal and personal motivations.
In a basic sense, humans are better at monitoring when in-the-loop (actively
engaged in the control loop) than when out-of-the-loop (not actively engaged in the
control loop) (Parasuraman, Mouloua, & Malloy, 1996). Humans tend to be less
aware of changes in the environmental or system states when those changes are
under the control of another agent (whether that agent is automation or another
human) than when they make the changes themselves” (Parasuraman, Sheridan, &
Wickens, 2000, p. 291).
During testimony at a 2009 NTSB public hearing that additional research is
needed to determine how to train pilots to be more effective at monitoring it was
noted that:
we also need to develop and train the specific techniques that pilots can use.
It’s not enough to say you’re supposed to monitor A, B and C. We need to
say how to do it or when to do and what techniques you can use …. As with
many procedural issues, you have to start with the theory in the classroom,
but that’s not going to do much good. You’ve got to practice it repetitively
until it’s automatic and then you’ve got to check it (NTSB, 2009, pp. 583584).
Method
This research study obtained information from the literature of relevant
material, and data collected through two primary means: analysis of reports
submitted to ASRS, and a case analysis approach to extracting information from
selected aircraft accident reports.
Data coding and collection
To collect relevant data from ASRS reports and aircraft accident reports, a
Common Data Coding and Collection Form (CDCCF) was developed and utilized
for each reviewed report. The CDCCF was used to code information pertaining to:
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The flight phase in which the flight path deviation occurred
The role of each pilot when inadequate monitoring led to a flight path
deviation
Activity the crew was engaged when the flight path deviation occurred
Status of automation engage when the flight path deviation occurred
Factors that contributed to the poor monitoring, such as: poor planning,
workload,
attention
management,
distraction,
fatigue,
and
boredom/complacency
Who/what first detected the flight path deviation; e.g., pilot, cockpit alerting
device, or air traffic control agency or mechanism.
Consequences of the inadequate monitoring, such as stall-inducing
airspeed/angle-of-attack, course deviation, altitude deviation, loss of
control, and loss of separation.

ASRS Reports
ASRS was established in 1976 to identify problematic issues within the U.S.
National Airspace System (Aviation Safety Reporting System, 2014a). Pilots, air
traffic controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers, and anyone else
interested in reporting potential safety-related problems may submit a report to
ASRS (ASRS, 2014a). Since its inception, ASRS has received over one million
reports and is considered “one of the world’s largest sources of information on
aviation safety and human factors” (ASRS, 2014a, p. 15).
A search of the ASRS database was conducted to seek reports submitted
from pilots of aircraft with a maximum gross takeoff weight of 14,501 pounds or
more, and were submitted to ASRS between 2000 and June 2014. The study
included analysis of 110 ASRS reports.
Because the scope of this research is focused on errors in monitoring flight
path, reports involving taxi path deviations were excluded from the study as well
as cases involving inadequate monitoring of radio communications, intra-cockpit
communications, traffic, aircraft systems, and anything else not directly related to
monitoring flight path.
To test the aforementioned research hypothesis, a Chi Square Test of
Independence was utilized.
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Aircraft Accident Reports
A case analysis approach was undertaken to further provide granularity into
the issue of flight path deviations resulting from inadequate monitoring. The
accident database consisted of 25 accident reports in which poor monitoring of
flight path was cited by the official accident investigation authority. Of the 25
reviewed accidents, 22 were investigated by the NTSB. The remaining three were
investigated by the accident investigation authorities from the countries where the
crash occurred.
The reviewed accidents occurred between December 1972 and July 2013.
These accidents collectively claimed 894 lives and incurred 180 serious injuries.
Ten of the accident aircraft were operating under 14 Code of Federal
Regulations Part 121, five were operating under Part 135 as scheduled air carrier
operations, six were operated as foreign air carriers, two were operated as ondemand charter flights under Part 135, and two were being operated under Part 91.
Two of the Part 121 flights were being operated as cargo flights with no passengers.
Each of these reports were read and data extracted using the CDCCF.
Fifteen accidents were Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), while 10
involved stalls followed by loss of control. In three of the loss of control events, the
crew regained control of the aircraft before ground impact. There were no fatalities
associated with those events.
To test the aforementioned research hypothesis, a Chi Square Test of
Independence was utilized.
Results
ASRS Reports
The 110 collected ASRS reports were analyzed for commonalities and
differences among data points.

Pilot role assignment. One of the research objectives was to determine if
there may be an unexpected number of cases where one pilot was flying versus
another. All but one report provided information regarding which pilot was flying.
Of the 109 reports that provided information, the captain was the pilot PF in 61
reports (56%) and the first officer was the PF in 48 reports (44%).
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Flight phase. Table 1 depicts the flight phase in which the flight path
deviation occurred. The data clearly show that in this review of ASRS reports, the
vast majority of flight path deviations occurred in the combined flight phases of
climb (n = 29), descent (n = 50), or on approach (n = 22). One-hundred and one of
the 110 reports (92%) fell into this category.
Table 1
Flight phase in which monitoring error occurred due to lack of flight path
monitoring, as reported in 110 ASRS reports.

Flight Phase

Frequency

Percent (%)

Climb

29

26

Level Flight

9

8

Descent

50

46

Approach

22

20

Total

110

100

Activities. The research probed flight crew activities at the time the flight
path deviation occurred. Seventy-eight of the 110 (70.9%) reports provided
information regarding activities the crew may have been involved in shortly before
the flight path deviation occurred. Table 2 illustrates those activities. For brevity,
only those activities that were cited in five or more cases are depicted. Therefore,
the frequency total does not equal the total number of reports in which activities
were reported (78). Additionally, the categories are not mutually exclusive;
therefore, each report can include multiple reported distracting activities. For
example, one report mentioned the crew was engaged in programming the Flight
Management System (FMS), chart reading, and resetting altimeters at transition
altitude.
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Table 2
Activities pilots were engaged in when a flight path deviation occurred, as reported
in 78 of 110 ASRS reports.

Activity

Frequency

Percentage (%)

Programming FMS

18

23.0

Radio communications/PA

18

23.0

Searching for traffic/landmarka

10

12.8

Dealing with abnormal condition

8

10.2

Normal checklists

7

9.0

Chart Reading/approach briefing

5

6.4

Note. Reported activities are not mutually exclusive.
One report mentioned the crew was searching for a landmark that was required to
be seen on a charted visual approach.
a

Contributing factors. Reporters cited several contributing factors to the
poor monitoring and subsequent flight path deviation. Of the 110 reports in the
ASRS dataset, 92 provided information regarding factors that contributed. Table 3
depicts those contributing factors that were cited in five or more ASRS reports.
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Table 3
Contributing factors to flight path deviation, as cited by crews (reported in 92 of
110 ASRS reports): Factors that crews cited as being a contributing factor to their
flight path deviation, as reported in 92 of 110 ASRS reports.

Factor

Frequency

Percentage (%)

Distractions

38

41.3

Automation reliance

23

25.0

Fatigue

18

19.5

High workload

12

13.0

Complacency

9

9.7

Runway/arrival change

6

6.5

Rushing/time pressure

5

5.4

Note. Only those factors that were cited in five or more cases were included.
As stated, these categories are not mutually exclusive. Pilots used the word
“distractions” in 38 ASRS reports, but in many cases the reasons for the distractions
were captured in the other contributing factor categories (Table 3) or activities
(Table 2). For example, in one report the pilot wrote that airspeed bled off to 220
knots in a climb instead of the intended 300 knots. The autopilot had somehow
reverted to a vertical speed mode and neither pilot noticed it. The pilot mentioned
that at 17,000 feet, they were given a clearance to climb to a higher altitude. They
were simultaneously resetting altimeters at the transition altitude, and the captain
was checking a maneuver capability chart to see if they were legal to accept a
certain cruise altitude. The pilot wrote, “No excuse for getting that slow even due
to these many distractions and duties that were going on at the same time” (ASRS,
2014b, record no. 914396).
Flight deck automation. Of the 110 reports in the ASRS dataset, 58
provided information about autopilot engage status. In 23 of the 110 reports, pilots
provided evidence that they relied on automation to execute a task, and therefore,
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didn’t monitor the flight path parameters. One pilot wrote that he expected the
aircraft to begin a planned descent, but it did not. “We just got complacent and
failed to monitor the flight progress just for that few minutes” (ASRS, 2014b, report
no. 808249).
Two reports mentioned pilots making flight guidance system inputs, but not
verifying the selection on the flight mode annunciator. One report stated: “Both
pilots must confirm that any changes via the FCP is verified in the FMA!!!! There
was an assumption that the autopilot [had been selected but] was not verified before
both pilots began secondary tasks and tertiary tasks” (ASRS, 2014b, report no.
1100710).
Detection. Information regarding who or what first detected the flight path
deviation was contained in 104 of the 110 reports. In the vast majority of reports
(72 of 104 reports), the primary means of detection was someone or something
other than the flight crew. In nearly half (49 of 104) of the reports where detection
information was provided, ATC first alerted the crew of the deviation. In 22 of the
reports, the primary means of crew notification of the flight path deviation was an
onboard alerting system (TAWS, altitude alerter, TCAS, stick shaker, low speed
alerting system, overspeed warning, and bank angle alerting).
Consequences. Five reports listed multiple consequences; therefore, the
total number of consequences was 119. Table 5 depicts the frequencies of the
reported consequences.
Pilot role assignment. Twenty-three of the 25 accident reports provided
information regarding who was the PF at the time of the flight path deviation. Of
those, the captain was the PF in 15 of the accidents (65%) while the first officer
was the PF in 8 events (35%). Table 6 provides a distribution of consequences
across the various flight phases.
Flight phase. Table 7 shows the flight phase in which the monitoring error
led to a flight path deviation. Twenty-two of the 25 flight path deviations (88%)
occurred while the aircraft was in a climb (n = 4), descent (n = 1), or on approach
(n = 17).
Flight parameters not monitored. Table 8 illustrates which flight path
parameters were not properly monitored, leading to the flight path deviation.
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Table 5
Consequences of the flight path deviation that arose from inadequate monitoring,
as reported in 110 ASRS reports.

Consequence

Number of Reports

Altitude deviation

75

Course deviation

20

Speed deviation

14

Loss of separation

2

Well below glideslope

2

Collision course with ground or obstacle

2

Other

4a

Note. Consequences are not mutually exclusive; therefore, the total count of
consequences exceeded the total number of ASRS reports in the dataset.
a
Other categories were: excessive rate-of-descent on approach (n = 1); too low on
approach (n = 1); lined up with wrong runway (n = 1); and, excessive angle-of-bank
(n = 1).
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Table 6
Distribution by flight phase of consequences resulting from poor monitoring, as
reported in 110 ASRS reports.
Phase
Climb
Level
Descent
Approach
Totals

Altitude
Deviation
19
8
41
7
75

Course
Deviation
7
0
7
6
20

Speed
Deviation
5
1
3
5
14

Other

Totals

4
0
0
6
10

35
9
51
24
119

Note. Because some reports cited multiple consequences, the total number of
consequences exceeded the total number of ASRS reports. Of the 110 ASRS report,
there were 119 consequences.
Table 7
Flight phase in which monitoring error occurred due to lack of flight path
monitoring, as reported in 25 aircraft accident reports.
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Flight Phase

Frequency

Percent

Climb

4

16

Level Flight

3a

12

Descent

1

4

Approach

17

68

Total

25

100
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Table 8
Flight path parameter that was inadequately monitored, as found in 25 aircraft
accident reports.

Flight Path Parameter

Frequency

Percent

Airspeed

10

40

Altitude

6

24

Descent rate on approach

4

16

Course on approach

3

12

Bank angle

2

8

Total

25

100

Six of the 17 accidents that occurred on approach were due to crews
allowing the aircraft to reach unacceptably low airspeeds. Of the six accidents
involving failing to monitor altitude, four involved failing to level-off at the
appropriate altitude during an instrument approach. Each of these involved nonprecision instrument approaches. In three accidents the flight crew was looking for
the runway during the final stages of a nighttime instrument approach and not
adequately monitoring flight path. Two of these involved failing to monitor and
level-off at the minimum descent altitude (MDA), and one involved failing to detect
and correct an excessive decent rate.
Activities. In six of the 25 accidents, the flight crew was distracted by an
aircraft abnormality or malfunction when the flight path deviation occurred.
Contributing factors. Fatigue was cited in five of the accidents. Three
accidents involved unanticipated runway reassignment.. Likewise, one accident
involving a helicopter enroute to a ship, likely involved crew preoccupation
following a destination change.
Discussion
This section discusses the data analysis of ASRS reports and accident
reports. Categories discussed include pilot role assignment, flight deck automation,
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phase of flight in which the flight path deviation occurred, activities the crew was
involved in, factors that contributed to poor monitoring, how the deviation was
detected, and the consequences of the deviation.
Pilot role assignment
The research aimed to determine if there was a significant connection
between which pilot was flying when the flight path deviation occurred. This
interest was prompted by a 1994 NTSB safety study that looked at 37 crewinvolved air carrier accidents. That study found that the captain was the PF in 30 of
the 37 accidents (81%) (NTSB, 1994). As the NTSB (1994) pointed out, pilots
typically alternate flying legs, so the disproportionate number of legs for which the
captain was the PF as an unexpected result. Likewise, this research intended to
explore if a similar pattern may have existed in this study. Table 9 shows that in
56% of ASRS reports and 65% of accident reports that provided pilot role
information, the captain was the PF.
Table 9
Pilot role in 109 ASRS reports and 23 accident reports where such data was
provided.

Report type

Captain

First Officer

ASRS data

61 (56%)

48 (44%)

Accident data 15 (65%)

8 (35%)

Results show there was no statistically difference between accidents and
non-accidents in this study’s dataset regarding which pilot was the PF when
inadequate monitoring led to a flight path deviation.
Although statistical significance may have been lacking, an examination of
the numbers in Table 9 indicate that in a higher percentage of cases, the captain was
the PF in the ASRS reports and in the accident reports. As noted, disproportionate
numbers for captain flying were also reported in NTSB’s 1994 safety study.
Follow-on research is warranted to determine if first officers may be less effective
at monitoring and detecting errors committed by captains.
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Flight deck automation
The autopilot was engaged in 48 of the 58 ASRS reports that contained
information about autopilot engage status. In the accident reports that provided
autopilot engage status, 13 of the 17 reports stated the autopilot was engaged when
the flight path deviation initially occurred. With modern flight decks where
autopilots are used for vast majority of the time, the fact that such a high percentage
of cases involved autopilots being engaged is not remarkable. What is noteworthy,
however, is that in many cases, the pilots appeared to have relegated flight path
control, and hence, monitoring of the flight path, to the automation.
The literature review cited seemingly contradicting information about when
someone is a better monitor of automation – when they are actively engaged in the
control loop or completely hands-off. This research suggests that both viewpoints
are partially correct. “Actively involved in the control loop” doesn’t necessarily
mean actively engaged in manipulating controls – it means actively engaged
mentally with what the automation (or other pilot) is doing and should be doing.
This active monitoring process keeps the operator actively engaged in the control
loop without having to sacrifice the mental and physical capacity of actually
manipulating controls.
Flight phase
Within each database, the research examined if there were predominate
flight phase(s) in which inadequate monitoring led to flight path deviation(s).
Sixty-eight percent of the accidents in this study occurred in a phase of flight
that represents only 15% of flight time, according to flight time estimates by Boeing
(2013). This highlights the threat-rich environment that exists on approach, and
there is a critical need for heightened monitoring in this flight phase.
The ASRS reports indicated that92% of flight path deviations occurred while the
aircraft was either in a climb, descent, or approach phase of flight, while 88% of
the accidents were in one of these three flight phases. Furthermore, the flight path
deviations occurred during descent or approach in 65% of ASRS reports and 72%
of accidents.
Activities
The research explored which predominant activities may have been
conducted by the crew shortly before or during the flight path deviation. FMS
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programming, radio communications, scanning for traffic, reading checklists, and
other flight-related activities were reported in a number of the ASRS reports.
Compared to other activities listed in Table 2, there was a statistically significant
difference was found for FMS programming and radio communications/PA
announcements (χ2 = 14.55, df = 5, p = .012).
Table 10
Percentage of ASRS reports and accident reports in this study according to flight
phase.

Flight Phase

ASRS (%)

Accidents (%)

Climb

26

16

Level Flight

8

12

Descent

46

4

Approach

20

68

While conduct of these duties is necessary, in several ASRS reports it
appears that pilots became consumed in these activities and subsequently failed to
adequately scan vital flight instruments. The familiar phrase “aviate, navigate,
communicate” must also imply monitoring; if a pilot is not not monitoring, then
they are not able to aviate.
Interestingly, when compared to the same data in the ASRS reports, this
research discovered a disproportionate number of accidents in which the crew was
dealing with an aircraft malfunction when the flight path deviation occurred. Eight
of the 78 ASRS reports (10%) that provided information regarding crew activities
mentioned they were dealing with a malfunction. By comparison, in six of the 25
accidents (24%) the crew was involved with resolving an aircraft malfunction. The
cause of the flight path deviation was not the aircraft abnormality itself, but rather,
the distraction associated with the abnormality and the subsequent failure to
monitor the flight path.

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2015

17

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 2 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 8

After studying 230 ASRS reports where crews reported dealing with aircraft
malfunctions, Sumwalt and Watson (1995) suggested that “an aircraft malfunction
should serve as an immediate ‘red flag’ to crewmembers, warning them to be alert
against the loss of situational awareness” (p. 6).
Contributing factors
In 38 ASRS reports pilots described distractions that contributed to their
monitoring failures. Although many of the distractions were covered in other
categories, it is telling that the word “distraction” was used in 38 of 92 (41%)
reports in which pilots cited factors that contributed to their flight path deviation.
Two significant problems can arise from interruptions: not returning to the
original task and returning at a place other than intended, also known as a
sequencing error. Testimony received at NTSB’s hearing of the 2009 Colgan Air
crash stated:
If we’re in the middle of a task and something interrupts us, and the
interruption is typically very salient, very abrupt, so we turn our attention
to this interruption, take care of the interruption, but then after we’re
finished with that, it is very, very easy to get sucked into the next task in the
queue, forgetting that we didn’t finish that task that was interrupted. (NTSB,
2009, p. 580)
Detection
Monitoring is how we detect deviations from expected parameters. In the
accident cases, the errors were not detected before an accident occurred. Therefore,
this discussion centers around ASRS data, which revealed that someone or
something detected the deviation prior to flight crews in 72 of the 104 reports (69%)
that provided detection information.
Chi-square test goodness of fit revealed a significant result, χ2 = 15.39, df
= 1, p < .001. This underscores that in these cases, crews were not good at
monitoring. Keeping these results in perspective, the fact that airplanes aren’t
crashing daily is indicative of early detection and recovery from flight path
deviations by flight crews. Either deviations are not occurring that frequently, or
they are caught before accidents or serious excursions occur.
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Consequences
The consequences in this study ranged from benign events such as altitude
deviations that only the air crew noticed, to full-blown accidents that caused loss of
life.
One-hundred and ten of the 119 reported consequences (92%) found in the
ASRS data occurred during the combined flight phases of climb, descent, and
approach. The majority of the consequences that arose during these combined flight
phases were altitude deviations (n = 67), the aircraft is transiting through altitudes
at high rates of climb or descent.
As shown in Table 6, 24 of the 119 consequences found in the ASRS study occurred
during approach. These events involved cases in which crews found themselves
well below desired approach speeds, well below glideslope, descending toward the
ground with excessive descent rates, descending below the assigned approach
altitudes, being on a collision course with obstacles, and being lined-up with wrong
runways. Because these events occurred on approach, where there was less altitude
to recover from the deviations, the risk for these consequences was potentially
higher than if they occurred in different flight phases.
The research examined the possibility of a relationship between flight phase
and the consequence. There was a statistically significant result for altitude
deviations in descent phase of flight, χ2 = 19.68, df = 3, p < .001. There were no
other statistically significant results.
The parameters that were not monitored varied between ASRS and
accidents reports. The largest number of items not monitored in ASRS reports was
altitude, as manifested by 75 altitude deviations (68% of the 110 ASRS reports).
For the accident reports in the study, airspeed was the leading category of items not
monitored (40% of 25 accident reports). In fact, all five of the accidents noted in
this study which occurred in the past decade involved failure to monitor speed.
Technological advances have helped to prevent many of the types of
accidents found in this study. For instance, CFIT accidents have dropped
substantially since requirements to install the Terrain Awareness and Warning
System (TAWS) have been in place. Moreover, TAWS likely would have
prevented 12 of the crashes in this study, had it been installed and operational on
the accident aircraft. TAWS is now required for each of the types of aircraft that
were involved in those 12 accidents.
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The current last line layer of defense for airspeed monitoring, however, is stall
warning systems. Repeated accidents, several of which were those reviewed in this
study, show that crews don’t always react properly to stall warning. As a result,
NTSB has repeatedly called for – alerting systems – warnings that annunciate
before the actual stall warning – to notify crews of impending low speed situations.
As it stands now, the text implies that low speed situations are alerts that annunciate
before the actual stall warning, which is not the correct interpretation.
In summary, the industry has made measurable progress in developing
technology to prevent many types of accidents related to failed flight path
monitoring. TAWS helps prevent CFIT; ATC and altitude alerters help prevent
altitude deviations from becoming larger excursions; Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS) prevents altitude deviations from becoming midair
collisions. What has not been successfully implemented at this point is low
speed/low energy alerting systems. The findings of this study suggest a safetyrelated need for development and implementation of low speed/low energy alerting
systems.
Findings and Recommendations
The following findings and recommendations are offered to improve flight
path monitoring and increase aviation safety. This study’s literature review and data
analyses underscore the importance of the need for pilots to plan ahead, get ahead,
and stay ahead. Workload management strategies should be developed and
incorporated so pilots can monitor at critical junctures in flight. For example,
considering the vulnerability of flight path deviations during descent and approach,
pilots should plan to brief the approach prior to beginning descent. This includes
loading the planned approach into the FMS along with other related activities that
can be done in advance. Although this planning may sound intuitive, this research
revealed that the pilots in these events did not practice effective workload
management strategies. Data show that pilots are, in some cases, pilots relegated
aircraft control and the monitoring of flight path, to automation.
The literature that discusses monitoring of automation – whether in the
control loop or not – may be misleading. While manually manipulating controls,
the pilot is devoting attentional and physical resources to controlling the aircraft,
which may allow monitoring to be sacrificed. On the other hand, being too far
removed from the control loop may allow the pilot to become disengaged from
monitoring. One strategy to keep pilots actively engaged in the control loop comes
not necessarily from manually manipulating the controls, but by having pilots
“mentally flying” the aircraft when automation (or the other pilot) is flying. This
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can be accomplished by having the pilot callout anticipated FMA changes before
they occur, instead of waiting for them to occur. This is similar to an approach that
USAir developed in the early 1990’s for altitude callouts, where the pilot was
directed to make the callout prior to sounding of the altitude alerter. This forced the
pilot to remain actively engaged with altitude monitoring. If a callout was missed,
this type of arrangement would require immediate feedback to the pilot to indicate
that their monitoring had lapsed (Sumwalt, 1995). Lastly, having pilots point to the
FMA to confirm proper annunciation appearance is another way of keeping them
in the control loop.
According to this study, crews were particularly vulnerable to flight path
deviations during the descent and approach phases of flight. The descent and
approach phases of flight in this study were particularly vulnerable to flight path
deviations. Pilots should treat these areas with particular caution, including
extending sterile cockpit-like procedures to include the entire descent phase.
Procedural designers should review procedures and non-monitoring tasks should
be re-scheduled, if possible, to different flight phases so they that don’t conflict
with monitoring during these critical phases. For example, one airline moved a
10,000 foot PA announcement to top-of-descent to avoid having a split cockpit
during later stages of descent. Given that low airspeed situations continue to pose
problems for aviation safety, low speed/low energy alerting systems should be
developed and installed.
Follow-on research is needed to determine if first officers are less effective
than captains at monitoring and detecting flight path deviations made by captains.
FAA’s training rule requires that by March 2019, air carrier training programs must
include training on monitoring. Although determining the best means of training is
not within the scope of this paper, information gleaned in the literature review
indicates that simply presenting monitoring information via PowerPoint
presentations should not be the only training method. It must be stressed during
simulator training where pilots have the opportunity to practice workload
management and optimal monitoring skills. In this regard, Dismukes stated:
“You’ve got to practice it repetitively until it’s automatic and then you’ve got to
check it” (NTSB, 2009, pp. 583-584).
The reviewed literature indicated that pilots may not fully understand what
automation modes are telling them. If pilots don’t understand what it is doing or
should be doing, they can’t properly monitor it. Just as a type rating oral exam
quizzes pilots extensively on systems knowledge, the oral exams should spend a
considerable amount of time quizzing the pilot on FMA indications. The pilot
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candidate should be able to state with precision explicitly what FMA modes should
be indicated for each phase of flight.
Monitoring is a very broad term. Some have indicated that when pilots hear
the term “monitoring,” it means different things to different people (J. Klinect,
personal conversation, November 20, 2012). As a result, the emphasis on flight path
monitoring may have gotten lost. Captain John Cashman, formerly Boeing’s chief
test pilot and director of flight operations, suggests a more descriptive term may be
“instrument scanning” to clearly spell-out that the focus is on the basic instrument
scan of flight path instruments, and not necessarily on monitoring aircraft systems,
the actions of other pilots, ATC, etc. (J. Cashman, personal conversation, June 23,
2014).
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